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1 Introduction
Following the seminal contributions by Feldstein (1995, 1999), the recent public
finance literature has focused on the so-called elasticity of taxable income (ETI)
to measure the behavioural responses to changes in taxation. The ETI is a more
comprehensive measure of behavioural responses to changes in taxation than e.g.
the labour supply elasticity because it captures the full range of tax base responses
including effort, occupational choice, tax avoidance and tax evasion. The ETI may
therefore provide a better measure for the efficiency costs of taxation, although there
is an active debate on whether or not the ETI is a sufficient statistic to measure the
deadweight loss from taxation (Chetty, 2009; Saez et al., 2012; Doerrenberg et al.,
2016).
In this paper we estimate the ETI for the Netherlands. Specifically, we consider
the responsiveness of taxable labour income of employees to changes in (effective)
marginal tax rates. We use a rich data set, the Labour Market Panel of Statistics
Netherlands (2009), that contains both taxable labour income data from the Tax
Office and a large number of socioeconomic variables taken from the Labour Force
Survey (education) and from the municipalities (ethnicity, household type) that
are typically absent from tax return data. The data set covers the period 1999–
2005. The 2001 tax reform in the Netherlands generates large exogenous variation
in marginal tax rates at different segments of the income distribution.
We estimate the ETI by running a regression of the change in log taxable labour
income on the change in the log of the net-of-tax rate (1 minus the effective marginal
tax rate) and a number of controls. ETI studies typically look at either the elas-
ticity of broad income (before deductions) or the elasticity of taxable income (after
deductions) as the dependent variable. Our outcome variable of taxable labour in-
come is closer to the concept of broad income than to the concept of taxable income,
taxable labour income is broad income minus work-related deductions but before
personal deductions.1 The empirical literature on the ETI has identified a number
of concerns that we need to address. One concern is the endogeneity of the marginal
tax rate. In a tax system with rising marginal tax rates, a higher income leads to a
higher marginal tax rate when the individual moves to a higher tax bracket. This
1The taxable labour income variable that we use is very close to the concept of adjusted gross
income in the US.
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creates a relationship between the error term and the net-of-tax rate and therefore
leads to biased estimates. Following Auten and Carroll (1999) we deal with this
problem by using synthetic net-of-tax rates as an instrument for actual net-of-tax
rates. Specifically, we project income forward using average income growth, and
calculate synthetic marginal tax rates using this projected (exogenous) income.
Another concern is mean reversion in income growth. Individuals that experience
a positive (negative) shock in income in one period are more likely to have lower
(higher) subsequent income growth than individuals that do not have a positive
(negative) shock to income. This leads to mean reversion in incomes. When the
reform targets mostly low-income groups or high-income groups this may again lead
to a bias in the estimates of the ETI. Again following Auten and Carroll (1999), we
control for mean reversion by including log base-year income in the control variables.
A further concern are other exogenous group-specific changes in income. For
example, skill-biased technological change or globalization may cause the incomes of
high-wage earners to rise faster than the incomes of low-wage earners. If the reform
targets high-wage earners we run the risk of confounding the treatment effect of the
change in tax rates with differential trends for different income groups. We argue
that this is less of a concern in our case. First, we show that the income distribution
was stable over the decade before the reform, similar to the case of Denmark studied
in Kleven and Schultz (2014). Second, also similar to Kleven and Schultz (2014),
we study a reform that led to significant changes in marginal tax rates for different
groups of the income distribution, not just high-wage earners but also low- and
middle-wage earners, and within some groups we have both positive and negative
changes as well. Third, similar to Kleven and Schultz (2014), we have a data set that
includes socioeconomic variables. This allows us to control for differential trends for
individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics like the level of education
and ethnicity. However, as a robustness check we also consider the solution to
differential trends offered by Gruber and Saez (2002), they control for differential
trends across the income distribution by including a spline in log base-year income
in the set of controls.
Our main findings are as follows. In our base specification we find an ETI of 0.24
for all workers. This ETI is robust to different ways of controlling for exogenous
income growth, the income cutoff and the choice of base year. For workers with a
high income (>50K euro) the ETI is higher, though the exact value of their elasticity
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depends on the way we control for exogenous income growth. We also find that the
ETI is higher for women than for men. Finally, we find that the ETI is higher than
the elasticity of annual hours worked.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we present the first esti-
mates for the ETI in the Netherlands using the Gruber and Saez (2002) method-
ology.2 Indeed, there is a large number of ETI studies for Anglo-Saxon countries
(e.g. Feldstein, 1995; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Sillamaa and Veall, 2001; Gruber and
Saez, 2002; Kopczuk, 2005; Weber, 2014; Burns and Ziliak, 2016) and for Scandi-
navia (e.g. Aarbu and Thoresen, 2001; Hansson, 2007; Blomquist and Selin, 2010;
Holmlund and Soderstrom, 2011; Gelber, 2014; Kleven and Schultz, 2014; Thoresen
and Vatto, 2015), but only a handful of studies for Continental Europe. Table A.1
in the appendix gives an overview of ETI studies. Studies for Anglo-Saxon countries
typically find a relatively high ETI, with recent estimates suggesting a value for the
elasticity of broad income of 0.29 (Burns and Ziliak, 2016) to 0.48 (Weber, 2014).
Studies for Scandinavia typically find a relatively low ETI, with recent estimates
suggesting a value of around 0.02-0.05 for the broad income elasticity in Norway
(Thoresen and Vatto, 2015), 0.06 for Denmark (Kleven and Schultz, 2014) and 0.09-
0.15 for Sweden (Gelber, 2014). Clearly, the deadweight loss of taxation is quite
different for an ETI of 0.1 than for an ETI of 0.4. Hence, obtaining estimates for
the ETI for countries in Continental Europe is of considerable importance. Lehmann
et al. (2013) estimate an elasticity of broad income of 0.22 for France, using a re-
form targeted at lower incomes. Doerrenberg et al. (2016) estimate a broad income
elasticity of 0.16-0.28 for Germany, using several reforms. Our base estimate of 0.24
for the Netherlands is in line with the findings for France and Germany. Hence, it
appears that the elasticity of broad income in Continental European countries takes
an intermediate position between Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia.
Our second contribution is that we compare the elasticity of taxable labour in-
come with the elasticity of annual hours worked. Annual hours worked responses
represent real distortions, whereas other tax base responses may only represent shift-
ing behaviour with potentially large fiscal and other externalities. There are only a
few studies that compare the two, information on hours worked is typically lacking
in tax return data.3 Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) report a substantial elasticity of
2An earlier version of this paper was published as a technical report (Jongen and Stoel, 2013).
3Indeed, Saez et al. (2012, p.38) argue that “[I]t would certainly be valuable to follow upon
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broad income for high-income earners in the US, but do not find an increase in
reported hours of work. In a recent study, Thoresen and Vatto (2015) find a small
but positive and significant hours worked elasticity for wage earners in Norway of
0.04–0.05, which is very close to their estimated broad income elasticity of 0.02–
0.06. We also find a positive significant hours worked elasticity for wage earners in
the Netherlands of 0.05, but this elasticity is substantially lower than our estimated
broad income elasticity of 0.21 for the sample for which we also have data on hours
worked. Apparently, other mechanisms than hours worked seem to play a role in
tax-base responses in the Netherlands.
Our third contribution is that we estimate the short- to medium- or longer-run
taxable labour income elasticity, estimating the taxable labour income elasticity 1
year since the start of the reform (0.10 for the period 1999-2001), 3 years since the
start of the reform (0.17 for the period 1999-2003) and 5 years since the start of
the reform (0.24 for the period 1999-2005).4 We find that the elasticity is higher for
longer horizons.5 Following Gruber and Saez (2002), it is common practice to use
3-year intervals in the base specification. Our results suggest that this interval may
be too short to capture the full tax-base responses to changes in marginal tax rates,
and the same is true for hours-worked responses.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider the main features
of the 2001 tax reform that we use as exogenous variation in the empirical analysis.
Section 3 outlines our empirical methodology. In Section 4 we discuss the data set
and give some descriptive statistics. Section 5 gives the estimation results and a
number of robustness checks. Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes.
2 The 2001 tax reform
In our empirical analysis we use data for the period 1999–2005. The 2001 tax re-
form in the Netherlands generates large exogenous variation in effective marginal
tax rates. Table 1 shows the statutory tax bracket rates and the tax bracket lengths
over the data period. In both the pre- and post-reform period there were four tax
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) and systematically compare income reporting responses to tax changes
with real economic responses such as labor supply or output.”
4Using the same sample for the different horizons.
5Estimating the effect for all years, the full effect is realized 4 years after the reform.
5
Table 1: Changes in the tax system: 1999–2005
Pre reform Post reform
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Bracket rates (in %)
Income bracket 1 35.75 33.90 32.35 32.35 32.35 33.40 34.40
Income bracket 2 37.05 37.95 37.60 37.85 37.85 40.35 41.95
Income bracket 3 50.00 50.00 42.00 42.00 42.00 42.00 42.00
Income bracket 4 60.00 60.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00
Bracket lengths (in e)
Income bracket 1 6,807 6,922 14,870 15,331 15,883 16,265 16,893
Income bracket 2 21,861 22,233 27,009 27,847 28,850 29,543 30,357
Income bracket 3 48,080 48,898 46,309 47,745 49,464 50,652 51,762
Income bracket 4 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Income tax allowances and creditsa (maximum in e)
General allowance 3,993 4,061 – – – – –
General credit – – 1,576 1,647 1,766 1,825 1,894
Single parent allowanceb 3,042 3,094 – – – – –
Single parent creditb – – 1,261 1,301 1,348 1,381 1,401
Earned income tax allowances and credits (maximum in e)
General allowancec 1,440 1,605 – – – – –
General creditd – – 920 949 1,104 1,213 1,287
Single parent allowancee 3,042 3,094 – – – – –
Single parent creditf – – 1,261 1,301 1,348 1,381 1,401
Parent creditg – – 138 190 214 224 228
Additional parent credith – – – – – – 389
aTax allowances reduce taxable income (the financial gain depends on the marginal tax rate), tax credits reduce
the amount of taxes paid (the financial gain does not depend on the marginal tax rate). bSingle parent with a
dependent child < 27 years of age. cMaximum tax allowance for working individuals. The tax allowance is 12%
of gross earned income, up to the maximum. dMaximum tax credit for working individuals. The phase-in rate is
(approximately) 1.7% up to 50% of the annual minimum wage, and 11% of gross earned income beyond 50% of the
annual minimum wage, up to the maximum. eMaximum tax allowance for working single parents with a dependent
child < 12 years of age. The tax allowance is 12% of gross earned income, up to the maximum. fMaximum tax
credit for working single parents with a dependent child < 12 years of age in the year 2001 and < 16 years of age
in the years beyond 2002. The tax credit is 4.3% of gross earned income, up to the maximum. gTax credit for
working parents with a dependent child < 12 years of age. The tax credit is independent of gross earned income,
provided gross earned income exceeds (approximately) 25% of the annual minimum wage. hTax credit for working
single parents and secondary earners with a dependent child < 12 years of age. The tax credit is independent of
gross earned income, provided gross earned income exceeds (approximately) 25% of the annual minimum wage.
Figure 1: Change in synthetic marginal tax rate by income (singles): 1999–2001
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
brackets. In 2000, the last year before the tax reform, the first bracket rate was
33.9%, the second bracket rate was 37.95%, the third bracket rate was 50% and
the fourth (open) bracket rate was 60%. In 2001, the first year of the reform, the
rate in the first and second bracket dropped only slightly, to 32.35% and 37.60%
respectively, and then increased somewhat in the subsequent years. The third and
fourth bracket rates dropped by 8 percentage points to 42% and 52%, respectively.
However, there were also important shifts in bracket lengths. The first and the sec-
ond bracket became longer, reducing marginal tax rates for individuals that moved
to a lower tax bracket. The third tax bracket became shorter, which moved part of
the individuals that were in the third tax bracket to the fourth tax bracket, which
meant a slight increase in the marginal tax rate from 50 to 52% for this group.6
6In the years after 2001, the top of the third bracket moved up again, but not in real terms, as
this was simply the result of indexing the bracket lenghts with wage growth, and the same holds
for the other tax brackets.
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Figure 2: Histograms of year-on-year changes in marginal tax rates
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
Next to changes in bracket rates and bracket lenghts, another important driver of
changes in effective marginal tax rates was the substantial increase in the (general)
earned income tax credit (Arbeidskorting) in 2001. This earned income tax credit
was phased in up to 16,000 euro in 2001.7 This led to a significant drop in effective
marginal tax rates for low incomes. Furthermore, the change from tax allowances
(the benefit of which does depend on marginal tax rates) to tax credits (the benefit
of which does not depend on marginal tax rates) creates additional variation in
effective marginal tax rates in the lower part of the income distribution.
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in effective marginal tax rates. In this figure
we plot the change in effective marginal tax rates from 1999 to 2001 (for 2001 we
use synthetic marginal tax rates, more on this below) against income in year 1999.
From the table it is clear that the tax reform of 2001 reduced marginal tax rates for
large parts of the income distribution. However, also for large parts of the income
distribution there were hardly any changes. In particular, a large part of individuals
in the second tax bracket experiences hardly any change, and also individuals that
were shifted from the third to the fourth tax bracket hardly experienced any change.
These groups serve as control groups in the empirical analysis.
Table 1 also makes clear that there was basically one major change in marginal
tax rates in our data period. After 2001, tax rates and tax brackets remained
rather stable, at least up to 2005. This can also be seen in Figure 2, which shows a
histogram of year-on-year changes in effective marginal tax rates for our data set. We
see that for all year-on-year changes except 2000–2001 most individuals experience
hardly any change in the effective marginal tax rate (of course incomes and hence
marginal tax rates do change for some individuals), whereas in 2000-2001 there is
a clear second spike around –8%-points and also some smaller spikes of individuals
that experience a more modest decrease or increase in effective marginal tax rates.
7In 2001, the gross annual minimum wage was 15,130 euro. In the period we consider, the
earned income tax credit in the Netherlands had a phase-in range, but there was no phase-out, as
opposed to e.g. the EITC in the US.
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3 Empirical methodology
Following Auten and Carroll (1999), Gruber and Saez (2002) and Kleven and Schultz
(2014), our base specification reads:
log
(
Ei,t+s
Ei,t
)
= β0 + β1 log
(
1− T ′i,t+s(Ei,t+s)
1− T ′i,t(Ei,t)
)
+Xi,tβ2,x + β3 log(Ei,t) + εi. (1)
In this regression, Ei,t (Ei,t+s) denotes taxable labour income of individual i in year
t (t+ s), 1−T ′i,t(.) (1−T ′i,t+s(.))is the net-of-tax rate of individual i in year t (t+ s),
Xit are additional control variables (demographic dummies and sector dummies),
measured in the base year t, and εi is the error term.
8 We estimate the elasticity
of taxable income for different horizons s, allowing for a difference between short-
and medium-run effects. Specifically, we estimate differences for s equal to 2 years
(1999–2001), 4 years (1999–2003) and 6 years (1999–2005). β1 is our main parameter
of interest, the elasticity of taxable labour income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
There are a number of concerns that we need to address in our empirical analysis.
First, the marginal tax rate is endogenous. In a progressive tax system, a higher
income leads to a higher marginal tax rate when the individual moves to a higher
tax bracket. This creates a relationship between the error term and the net-of-tax
rate and therefore to biased estimates. Following Auten and Carroll (1999) we deal
with this problem by using synthetic net-of-tax rates as an instrument for actual net-
of-tax rates. Specifically, we project income forward using average income growth,
and calculate synthetic marginal tax rates using this projected income which reflects
the income in the absence of behavioural changes. We then estimate equation (1)
using two-stage least squares with the synthetic net-of-tax rates as an instrument
for actual net-of-tax tax rates.9 In the empirical analysis this instrument is always
very strong (available on request).
8In all regressions we report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and we weight observa-
tions by base year income and by the population weights in the data set.
9The first-stage equation reads:
log
(
1− T ′i,t+s(Ei,t+s)
1− T ′i,t(Ei,t)
)
= γ0 + γ1 log
(
1− T ′synthetici,t+s (Esynthetici,t+s )
1− T ′i,t(Ei,t)
)
+Xi,tγ2,x + γ3 log(Ei,t) + i,
where T ′synthetici,t+s (.) is the synthetic effective marginal tax rate corresponding to the synthetic
income Esynthetici,t+s in period t+ s.
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Another concern is mean reversion in income growth. Individuals that experience
a positive shock in income in one period are more likely to have lower subsequent
income growth than individuals that do not have a positive shock to income, and
vice versa for individuals that experience a negative income shock. This leads to
mean reversion in incomes. When the reform targets mostly low- or high-wage
earners this may again lead to a bias in the estimates. Again following Auten and
Carroll (1999), we control for mean reversion by including log base-year income in
the explanatory variables. We expect this variable to have a negative sign, so that
ceteris paribus individuals with a higher base year income will have lower subsequent
income growth. The results show that it is important to control for mean reversion,
in line with the findings of Kleven and Schultz (2014).
A further concern, recently emphasized by Kopczuk (2012), is that the dynamics
of mean reversion may be different for the treatment group (with substantial changes
in effective marginal tax rates) and control group (with minor changes in effective
marginal tax rates). Below we provide graphical evidence for the pre-reform period
that shows that these dynamics are quite similar for our treatment and control
group.
Yet another concern is that we need to control for other exogenous changes in
income. Indeed, skill-biased technological change or globalization may cause the
incomes of high-wage earners to rise faster than low-wage earners. If the reform
targets high-wage earners we run the risk of confounding the treatment effect of
the change in tax rates with differential trends for different income groups. We
believe that this is less of a concern in our case. First, the income distribution was
relatively stable over the decade before the reform, similar to the case of Denmark
studied in Kleven and Schultz (2014). Figure 3 shows that the income shares of
the top 10, 5, 1 and 0.5% of the income distribution were very stable in the decade
before the 2001 reform. Furthermore, Afman (2006, Table 1) shows that the same
is true for all income deciles. Figure 3 suggests some increase in top income shares
after the 2001 reform, but a break in the series, due to a change in the definition
of income, makes it hard to infer the effect of the 2001 reform. Figure 4 shows
the top wage income shares in our data set, there is no break in this series but the
data period is much shorter, which do suggest an increase in the top incomes shares
following the reform. Second, also similar to Kleven and Schultz (2014), we study
a reform that led to significant changes in marginal tax rates for different groups of
11
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Figure 3: Top primary income shares in the Netherlands: Income Panel
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Source: Jacobs et al. (2013). Data set: Income Panel (Inkomenspanelonderzoek) (remote access
version with uncensored top incomes) of Statistics Netherlands. The income shares are for ‘primary
income’, the sum of wage and profit income, per individual. There is a break in the series in 2001.
Additional income components (in particular one-off payments like severance pay) were included,
and some income components were obtained from other data sources than before (see Knoef, 2011,
for an overview of the most important changes).
Figure 4: Top wage income shares in the Netherlands: Labour Market Panel
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel) (uncensored wage
income) of Statistics Netherlands. The income shares are for wage income per individual. There
is no break in the wage income series.
the income distribution, not just high-wage earners but also low- and middle-wage
earners and within some income groups we have both positive and negative changes
(see Figure 1). Third, similar to Kleven and Schultz (2014) we have a data set that
includes socioeconomic variables that allow us to control for differential trends for
individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics like the level of education
and ethnicity.10 However, as a robustness check we also consider the solution to
differential trends offered by Gruber and Saez (2002) who control for differential
trends across the income distribution by including a spline in log base-year income.
These splines can be used to control for mean reversion and for different income
growth across income groups, such as skill-biased technological progress. However,
an issue with this method is that the coefficients of the splines could ‘soak up’
not only exogenous growth differentials but also the identifying variation of the tax
reform. Keeping this concern in mind, we also present results using a 5-piece spline
in log base-year income, dividing income groups in quintiles. The five knots of the
spline are added as variables to the regression and the coefficients capture quintile
specific income growth.
4 Data
We use data from the Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel) of Statistics Nether-
lands (2009). The Labour Market Panel is a rich and large administrative household
panel data set, starting in 1999. We have data for the period 1999–2005. This data
set combines administrative data on taxable labour income from the Tax Office with
administrative demographic individual and household information from municipal-
ities (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie), administrative data on hours worked and
the sector in which the individual is working (main occupation) from the Social
Statistical Panel (Sociaal Statistisch Bestand) and survey data on education from
the Labour Force Survey (Enquete Beroepsbevolking).
From this data set we select employees aged 20–55 in 1999, that earn more
than 10 thousand euro in 1999, that have no income from social insurance benefits
(e.g. disability, unemployment or early retirement benefits), and that do not change
between the states of single, single parent or part of a couple over the whole period
10Furthermore, we also include a dummy for the sector in which the individual is working to
allow for sector-specific wage growth.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics base year
Mean SD
Taxable labour income 1999 30,573 15,643
Net-of-tax rate 0.505 0.057
Age 39.709 7.974
Male 0.674 0.469
Female 0.326 0.469
Primary education (BO) 0.043 0.203
Lower secondary education (VMBO) 0.167 0.373
Higher secondary education (MBO, HAVO, VWO) 0.449 0.497
Tertiary education (HBO, WO) 0.342 0.474
Native 0.898 0.303
Western immigrant 0.029 0.167
Non-Western immigrant 0.074 0.261
Married couple with children 0.564 0.496
Married couple without children 0.155 0.321
Unmarried couple with children 0.032 0.175
Unmarried couple without children 0.117 0.321
Single 0.114 0.318
Single parent 0.018 0.134
Observations 160,601
Notes: Dutch abbreviations of education levels in brackets.
of 1999–2005. We make these selections to limit problems of mean reversion and
to remove big changes in marginal tax rates and income that are not linked to
the tax reform. Furthermore, we do not have information on personal deductions
in our data set. This creates measurement error in the net-of-tax rates, since we
have an imprecise measure of taxable income, and hence also in the change in the
net-of-tax rates. To mitigate this problem, we drop individuals whose marginal
tax rate changes by more than 30 percent, which are unrelated to the reform and
more importantly are likely to contain substantial measurement error.11 After these
selections are made we are left with 160,601 observations for the regressions.
11Specifically, we restrict the sample to individuals with an absolute change in the log of the
net-of-tax rate less or equal to .3. Table A.4 in the appendix shows that the estimated elasticities
are indeed somewhat smaller when we include the observations with bigger changes in effective
marginal tax rates, consistent with classical measurement error.
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Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample are given in Table 2. Mean taxable
labour income in 1999 is 30,573 euro. For the socioeconomic characteristics we use
the data for the base year 1999. Individuals in our sample are on average 39.7 years
old. 67% of individuals in our sample are men (due to the selections). Most of the
individuals have higher secondary education (45%) or tertiary education (34%), a
small minority has only primary education (4%) and some more individuals have
lower secondary education (17%). Regarding ethnicity, 90% is native Dutch, 3%
is Western immigrant and 7% is Non-Western immigrant. Looking at household
composition, most individuals are in a married couple with children (56%). The
second largest category is individuals in a married couple without children (16%).
The shares of singles and individuals in unmarried couples without children are
11% and 12%, respectively, and the shares of individuals in unmarried couples with
children (3%) and single parents (2%) are small.
We use the official tax-benefit calculator MIMOS-2 of CPB Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis for the 1999–2005 period to calculate effective marginal
tax rates. MIMOS-2 is a tax-benefit calculator that contains a detailed program-
ming of the tax-benefit system in the Netherlands, including all income dependent
subsidies and tax credits. We determine effective marginal tax rates by increasing
all gross incomes by 3 percent.12 Effective marginal tax rates are then calculated as
the change in gross income minus the change in disposable income over the change
in gross income.
Synthetic effective marginal tax rates are calculated for synthetic income. We
use the growth of average taxable labour income in our selection to project synthetic
income forward out of 1999. In the regressions we use the change in real taxable
labour income in 1999 euro, incomes from later years are deflated with the CPI.
Following Kleven and Schultz (2014, Figure 4), Figure 5 gives real taxable labour
income, normalized to 100 in the year 2000, for the ‘treatment group’, individuals
that experienced a decrease in their synthetic tax rates over the period 1999–2005,
and the ‘control group’, individuals that did not experience a decrease (or an in-
crease) in their synthetic tax rates over the period 1999–2005. We observe that the
average growth in taxable labour income is the same for the treatment and con-
12The Netherlands has an individual tax system where some subsidies and tax credits depend
on household income. For couples we calculate the effective marginal tax rate for each partner
separately, keeping the income of the other partner fixed.
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Figure 5: Labour income: treatment and control group (year 2000=100)
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
Figure 6: Labour income: treatment (large and small) and control group (year
2000=100)
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
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Figure 7: Semi-parametric relation instrument and taxable labour income
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
Figure 8: Strength of the instrument
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
Figure 9: Pre-reform mean reversion treatment (green) and control group (gold)
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Source: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands).
trol group prior to the reform, 1999–2000, but then taxable income grows somewhat
faster for the treatment group than the control group.13 Again following Kleven and
Schultz (2014, Figure 4), Figure 6 also shows real taxable labour income, again nor-
malized to 100 in the year 2000, separately for the treatment group that experiences
a large drop in the effective marginal tax rate (< –5 percent) and the treatment
group that experiences a small drop in the effective marginal tax rate (0 percent <
x < –5 percent). Again the treatment groups and the control group show a similar
growth prior to the reform, but the treatment group that experiences a larger drop
in effective marginal tax rates show a larger subsequent growth in taxable labour
income than the treatment group with a smaller drop in the effective marginal tax
rate. Note however that this is not controlling for differences in demographic char-
acteristics, differences in the sector in which the individual works or mean reversion.
This is what we do in the regression analysis below.
However, before we turn to the regression analysis, we first present a few addi-
tional graphical checks on the validity of the empirical approach. Following Weber
13The divergence is less pronounced than in Kleven and Schultz (2014), but the changes in the
effective marginal tax rate are also smaller than the reform they consider.
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(2014, Figure 1), Figure 7 gives a semi-parametric representation of the relation
between the outcome variable (the growth in taxable labour income) and the in-
strument (the predicted change in the log marginal net-of-tax rate).14 The dashed
lines give the 95% confidence interval. There is a positive relationship between the
instrument and the outcome variable, with some ‘flattening’ of the relation close to
zero.15
Again following Weber (2014, Figure 2), Figure 8 gives a graphical representation
of the first-stage of the regressions, the relation between the predicted log of the
marginal net-of-tax rate change and the actual log of the marginal net-of-tax rate
change. The relation is very strong for the most part. Only at the upper tail the
relationship weakens and even seems to reverse, but there are only a few observations
there.
Finally, following Kopczuk (2012, Figure 20), Figure 9 plots the growth in taxable
labour income in the pre-reform period 1999–2000 against the level of taxable labour
income in 1999, separately for the treatment group (decrease in effective marginal tax
rate) and the control group (no decrease or increase in effective marginal tax rate).
Note that there are no individuals in the control group for the highest incomes, since
the reform reduced the top marginal tax rate. We see that for the income segment
for which the treatment and control group overlap, the growth in taxable labour
income is quite similar. Furthermore, the relation is negative, as we would expect
in the case of mean reversion.
5 Results
Table 3 gives the base results for all workers. We show three different specifications,
one with no pre-reform income controls, one with log base-year income to control for
mean reversion and one with a 5-piece spline in log base-year income to control for
mean reversion and other remaining differential trends in exogenous income growth.
In all regressions we include socioeconomic controls and dummies for the sector in
which the individual is working (all measured in 1999).
14Using the lpolyci command in Stata, with a third-order polynomial and a bandwidth parameter
of 0.16, following Burns and Ziliak (2016).
15Other papers that present similar plots show a similar flattening of the relation close to zero
(e.g. Weber, 2014; Burns and Ziliak, 2016; Doerrenberg et al., 2016).
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Table 3: Base results: all workers
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005
No pre-reform income –0.0188∗ 0.0209∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
control (0.0101) (0.0112) (0.0129)
Log base-year income 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.1657∗∗∗ 0.2415∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0143)
5-piece spline in log 0.0754∗ 0.1681∗∗∗ 0.2226∗∗∗
base-year income (0.0385) (0.0339) (0.0356)
Observations 160,601 160,601 160,601
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are weighted by population weights and
1999 income. Base specification projecting synthetic incomes out of 1999
and using socioeconomic individual and household characteristics and sector
dummies for 1999. Sample is restricted to individuals with labour income
>10,000 euro in 1999. Full estimation results for the specification with log
base-year income as the income control can be found in Table A.2 in the
appendix.
Not controlling for base-year income we find small, and even negative, ETIs, in
line with the findings of Kleven and Schultz (2014). However, when we include log
base-year income to control for mean reversion in income growth we find significant
positive ETIs, again in line with the findings of Kleven and Schultz (2014).16 The
elasticity rises from 0.10 in the short-run (1999–2001) to 0.24 for the medium to
longer run (1999–2005) when we use log base-year income as a control. The rise
in the ETI suggests that adjustment to the new marginal tax rates takes time.
Since Gruber and Saez (2002), it is common practice to use 3-year intervals in the
base specification (and present 1- or 2-year intervals as a robustness check). Our
16Full estimation results of the base specification can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix. The
controls used in the regressions are typically significant and show that income growth decreases
with age, increases with an individual’s level of education, is higher for males than for females, is
higher for individuals in households with children, and is slightly higher for immigrants than for
natives. Log base-year income has a significant negative coefficient, indicating it is important to
control for mean reversion.
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results suggest that this interval may be too short to capture the full tax base
responses to changes in marginal tax rates.17 Finally, when using the 5-piece spline
we find very similar results, indeed the parameter estimates are not statistically
significantly different, the elasticity rises from 0.08 in the 1999–2001 period to 0.22
for the 1999–2005 period. The fact that we find similar results using log base-year
income and using a spline in log base-year income is consistent with a stable income
distribution.18
Table 4 shows that our results are robust to the income threshold. Specifically,
when we select individuals with an income above 5,000 euro in 1999, instead of
10,000 euro in the baseline, we find similar elasticities. In particular, with our
preferred specification with log base-year income as the income control, we now
get an estimate of 0.23, compared to 0.24 in the base sample. The results using
the 5-piece spline are also very similar, 0.20 compared to 0.22 when using the base
sample.
Table 5 shows that our results are also quite similar when we use 2000 as the base
year.19 When we use 2000 instead of 1999 as the base year, we find an elasticity of
0.18 compared to 0.24 in the baseline using log base-year income, and 0.21 compared
to 0.22 using the 5-piece spline. One potential advantage of using 2000 as the base
year is that we can include the log of 1999 income as well as the log difference
between 1999 and 2000 income, following Kopczuk (2005). This allows for a separate
treatment of mean reversion and differential trends. Using these income controls we
find a somewhat lower elasticity of 0.16 than the 0.18 when using only log year 2000
17And the same is true for hours worked responses, see below. Thoresen and Vatto (2015, Table
B.4) also find that the elasticity of broad income and hours worked rises when they use longer
intervals, also when they increase the interval length from 3 to 4 years. Estimating the effect for
all years, we find that the full effect is realized 4 years after the reform (1999-2004), see Table
A.3 in the appendix. Note that there are small differences with the base results for the period
1999–2001, 1999–2003 and 1999–2005, because now we only include observations whose (absolute)
change in effective marginal tax rates is less than 30% in 2002 and 2004 as well.
18Table A.4 shows that we obtain somewhat lower estimates when we also include observations
with bigger changes in effective marginal tax rates. However, as argued in the data section, the
additional observations are likely to be contaminated with measurement error. Indeed, the profile
of estimates with different sample selections follows the pattern of classical measurement error, with
the elasticity falling somewhat as we allow for bigger (absolute) changes in the effective marginal
tax rates.
19We prefer 1999 as the base year, because there might be anticipation effects.
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Table 4: Robustness check: base year income > 5 thousand euro
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005
No pre-reform income –0.0168∗ 0.0233∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗
control (0.0098) (0.0110) (0.0126)
Log base-year income 0.0956∗∗∗ 0.1609∗∗∗ 0.2345∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0096) (0.0122)
5-piece spline in log 0.0503 0.1521∗∗∗ 0.2047∗∗∗
base-year income (0.0394) (0.0348) (0.0365)
Observations 170,216 170,216 170,216
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Observations are weighted by population weights and 1999 income. Base specification
projecting synthetic incomes out of 1999 and using socioeconomic individual and household
characteristics and sector dummies for 1999. Sample is restricted to individuals with labour
income >5,000 euro in 1999.
Table 5: Robustness check: year 2000 as base year
(1) (2) (3)
Period 2000–2001 2000–2003 2000–2005
Log base-year income 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.1002∗∗∗ 0.1812∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0191) (0.0241)
5-piece spline in log 0.0326 0.1628∗∗∗ 0.2074∗∗∗
base-year income (0.0245) (0.0338) (0.0306)
Log income 1999 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗∗ 0.1587∗∗∗
and log deviation income 1999 and 2000 (0.0079) (0.0132) (0.0164)
Observations 160,065 160,065 160,065
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Observations are weighted by population weights and 2000 income. Base specification projecting
synthetic incomes out of 2000 and using socioeconomic individual and household characteristics
and sector dummies for 2000. Sample is restricted to individuals with labour income >10,000 euro
in 2000.
income.
In Table 6 we consider the outcomes of the base specification for different income
subgroups. We focus on the results for the period 1999–2005. We estimate somewhat
lower elasticities for the low income group (10–50K): 0.22 using log base-year income
and 0.12 using the 5-piece spline.20 Our preferred specification is with log base-year
income, since the 5-piece spline is more likely to soak up part of the remaining
variation in the smaller income segment. For the group with income between 50–
100K, we estimate an elasticity of 0.20 using log base-year income, and the estimate
drops somewhat to 0.17 when we include a 5-piece spline. For the group with income
above 50K, without upper bound21, we estimate the largest elasticities. Using log
base-year income as a control the estimate is 0.45, but this drops substantially to
0.27 when we include the 5-piece spline. Differential trends may play a role for the
higher incomes, and it is not directly clear which specification is to be preferred for
this group. However, our finding that taxable or broad income elasticities are higher
for higher incomes is consistent with the literature (Saez et al., 2012).
We also estimate the base regressions separately for single men and women, and
men and women in couples, the results can be found in Table 7. We find larger
elasticities for single women than for single men, and also (much) larger elasticites
for women in couples than for men in couples. The elasticity for single women is
somewhat lower than for women in couples, whereas the elasticity for single men is
higher than for men in couples.
Finally, also of interest is the size of the elasticity of taxable labour income
relative to the elasticity of annual hours worked, to see how much of the estimated
response is due to a change in labour supply and how much is due to other factors.
We do not have full coverage of hours worked, about 40 percent of the workers
are covered in the data set, which are mostly workers in the public sector and in
large companies. For these workers we estimate an ETI of 0.21 and an annual
hours worked elasticity of 0.05.22 Hence, the labour supply response captures only
part of the tax base response. This is consistent with the findings of Moffitt and
20For each income subgroup we construct a new spline in log base-year income.
21We always need to include medium income individuals as a control group, since we need a
control group where there was hardly any change in effective marginal tax rates.
22This intensive labour supply elasticity is in line with estimates of the labour supply literature,
see Bargain et al. (2014) for an overview for European countries and the US, and Jongen et al.
(2014) for recent estimates for the Netherlands.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity: results for income subgroups
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005
Income 10-50K
Log base-year income 0.0829∗∗∗ 0.1430∗∗∗ 0.2164∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0092) (0.0116)
5-piece spline in base-year income 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.1234∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0197)
Observations 148,221 148,221 148,221
Income 50-100K
Log base-year income 0.1605∗∗∗ 0.1401∗∗∗ 0.2012∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0347) (0.0418)
5-piece spline in base-year income 0.0824∗∗ 0.0692∗∗ 0.1685∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0548) (0.0698)
Observations 11,516 11,516 11,516
Income >50K
Log base-year income 0.1292 0.3306∗∗∗ 0.4484∗∗∗
(0.0828) (0.0838) (0.0924)
5-piece spline in base-year income 0.0804∗ 0.1312∗∗ 0.2664∗∗∗
(0.0443) (0.0566) (0.0814)
Observations 12,382 12,382 12,382
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Observations are weighted by population weights and 1999 income. Base speci-
fication projecting synthetic incomes out of 1999 and using socioeconomic individual and
household characteristics and sector dummies for 1999.
Table 7: Heterogeneity: results by household type and gender
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005
Single men
Log base-year income 0.0677 0.1791∗∗∗ 0.2836∗∗∗
(0.0728) (0.0350) (0.0950)
5-piece spline in base-year income –0.0016 0.1513∗∗∗ 0.2865∗∗∗
(0.0436) (0.0548) (0.1105)
Observations 11,114 11,114 11,114
Single women
Log base-year income 0.1698∗∗∗ 0.3205∗∗∗ 0.4270∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0424) (0.0500)
5-piece spline in base-year income 0.1186∗∗∗ 0.2131∗∗∗ 0.3199∗∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0541) (0.0672)
Observations 10,194 10,194 10,194
Men in couples
Log base-year income 0.0290∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.1047∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0244) (0.0214)
5-piece spline in base-year income 0.0556∗∗ 0.1298∗∗∗ 0.1453∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0423) (0.0407)
Observations 97,190 97,190 97,190
Women in couples
Log base-year income 0.1956∗∗∗ 0.4273∗∗∗ 0.4566∗∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0464) (0.0400)
5-piece spline in base-year income 0.2432∗∗∗ 0.4081∗∗∗ 0.4764∗∗∗
(0.0557) (0.0738) (0.0858)
Observations 42,103 42,103 42,103
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Observations are weighted by population weights and 1999 income. Base speci-
fication projecting synthetic incomes out of 1999 and using socioeconomic individual and
household characteristics and sector dummies for 1999. Sample is restricted to individuals
with labour income >10,000 euro in 1999.
Table 8: Elasticity of taxable labour income vs. hours
worked
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005
All workers
Taxable labour income 0.0863∗∗∗ 0.1496∗∗∗ 0.2071∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0118) (0.0140)
Hours worked 0.0044 0.0340∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0106) (0.0110)
Observations 68,223 68,223 68,223
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations for taxable labour income are weighted by popu-
lation weights and 1999 income. Observations for hours worked are weighted by
population weights and 1999 hours worked. Base specification projecting syn-
thetic incomes out of 1999 and using socioeconomic individual and household
characteristics and sector dummies for 1999. Using log base-year income and
log base-year hours worked to control for mean reversion in income and hours
worked, respectively. Sample is restricted to individuals with labour income
>10,000 euro in 1999 and for which hours worked are observed.
Wilhelm (2000) for high incomes in the US, but quite different from the findings of
Thoresen and Vatto (2015) for Norway. We should note though that we measure
contractual hours worked. To the extent that individuals work more hours due to
the tax reform but this does not show up in their contractual working hours (e.g.
top income earners), we may underestimate the hours worked response. However,
note that the elasticity of taxable labour income also captures other effects on the
tax base, like e.g. changes in effort more generally, changes in occupational choice
and changes in tax avoidance via work-related tax deductibles.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper we have estimated the elasticity of taxable labour income in the Nether-
lands. In our base specification, using log base-year income to control for mean
reversion, for all workers we find an elasticity of 0.10 in the short run (1999–2001)
rising to 0.24 in the medium run (1999–2005). This elasticity is robust to how we
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control for exogenous income growth, the lower income threshold and the choice of
base year. Our estimate is in between the higher estimates for Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries and the lower estimates for Scandinavia. Furthermore, our estimate is close
to the recent estimates for France and Germany. We also find that the elasticity is
bigger for higher incomes and for women. Furthermore, we find that the elasticity
of taxable labour income is higher than the elasticity of (contractual) annual hours
worked, indicating that the (contractual) hours worked responses do not capture all
tax base responses.
Our findings have potential important implications for policymaking. In par-
ticular, when there are no fiscal or other externalities associated with the tax base
responses, the deadweight loss from marginal tax rates are substantially higher when
using the elasticity of taxable labour income than using the elasticity of annual hours
worked. For example, using a value of 0.25 for the elasticity of the tax base of the
top rate, Jacobs et al. (2013) calculate that the current top tax rate is close to the
top of the Laffer-curve.
We conclude by noting that there are a number of limitations to our data set
and our tax-benefit calculator that prevent us from studying a number of additional
issues. First, we cannot control for income effects since we have no information on
unearned income. However, most ETI studies find that income effects are relatively
small compared to substitution effects (Saez et al., 2012). Second, although we have
self-employed in our data set, we can not study their ETI because we do not have
a tax-benefit calculator to calculate their effective marginal tax rate. Third, we
would like to have longer pre-reform data on income, so that we can better control
for exogenous income growth and address remaining concerns about the potential
endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate instrument (Weber, 2014). Finally, we would
like to have more information on tax deductibles, so that we can decompose the
changes in the ETI into its components and also estimate the elasticity of taxable
income. In this respect the IPO (Income Panel) data set of Statistics Netherlands
looks promising. This data set is available for a much longer pre-reform period, and
has information on unearned income and additional information on tax deductibles.
However, for the moment there is no tax-benefit calculator for the IPO for the years
before 2001.
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Table A.2: Full estimation results with log base-year income
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005
Net-of-tax rate 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.1657∗∗∗ 0.2415∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0143)
Log base-year income –0.0665∗∗∗ –0.1259∗∗∗ –0.1392∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0105) (0.0121)
Lower secondary education 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0038)
Higher secondary education 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0510∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0043)
Tertiary education 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.1197∗∗∗ 0.1529∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0061)
Female –0.0524∗∗∗ –0.0904∗∗∗ –0.1179∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0052)
Western immigrant 0.0092∗∗ 0.0102∗∗ 0.0060
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0060)
Non-Western immigrant 0.0028 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0042)
Unmarried couple w/o children –0.0118∗∗∗ –0.0230∗∗∗ –0.0295∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0050)
Married couple w/o children –0.0188∗∗∗ –0.0186∗∗∗ –0.0199∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0050)
Unmarried couple w/ children 0.0025 0.0069 0.0185∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0088)
Married couple w/ children –0.0029 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0046)
Single parent 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0079)
Age –0.0039∗∗∗ –0.0029∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Age squared 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000 –0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 160,601 160,601 160,601
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses,
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Observations are
weighted by population weights and 1999 income. Base specification projecting synthetic incomes
out of 1999 and using socioeconomic individual and household characteristics and sector dummies
for 1999. Sector dummies are included but not reported (available on request). The sample is
restricted to individuals with labour income >10,000 euro in 1999.
Table A.3: Results for all reform years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2002 1999–2003 1999–2004 1999–2005
No pre-reform income 0.0236∗∗ 0.0204∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ 0.0752∗∗∗ 0.0716∗∗∗
control (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0113) (0.0123) (0.0130)
Log base-year income 0.1003∗∗∗ 0.1276∗∗∗ 0.1724∗∗∗ 0.2352∗∗∗ 0.2442∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0128) (0.0144)
5-piece spline in log 0.0816∗∗∗ 0.1583∗∗∗ 0.1856∗∗∗ 0.2371∗∗∗ 0.2333∗∗∗
base-year income (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0348) (0.0356) (0.0363)
Observations 157,249 157,249 157,249 157,249 157,249
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observa-
tions are weighted by population weights and 1999 income. Base specification projecting synthetic incomes
out of 1999 and using socioeconomic individual and household characteristics and sector dummies for 1999.
The sample is restricted to individuals with labour income >10,000 euro in 1999.
Table A.4: Results using different sample selections for the maximum (absolute) change
in the net-of-tax rate
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1999–2001 1999–2003 1999–2005 Observations
| Change in net-of-tax rate | <= 100% 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.1142∗∗∗ 0.1820∗∗∗ 175,763
(0.0256) (0.0115) (0.0159)
| Change in net-of-tax rate | <= 75% 0.0855∗∗∗ 0.1125∗∗∗ 0.1853∗∗∗ 173,855
(0.0261) (0.0115) (0.0159)
| Change in net-of-tax rate | <= 50% 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.1208∗∗∗ 0.1873∗∗∗ 171,244
(0.0260) (0.0115) (0.0153)
| Change in net-of-tax rate | <= 40% 0.1017∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗∗ 0.2125∗∗∗ 168,944
(0.0267) (0.0115) (0.0153)
| Change in net-of-tax rate | <= 30%a 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.1657∗∗∗ 0.2415∗∗∗ 160,601
(0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0143)
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, * denotes significant at the
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Observations are weighted by population weights and 1999 income.
Base specification, using log base-year income as the income control, projecting synthetic incomes out of 1999 and using
socioeconomic individual and household characteristics and sector dummies for 1999. Sector dummies are included but not
reported (available on request). The sample is restricted to individuals with labour income >10,000 euro in 1999. a Base
specification.

